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This paper clarifi es some of the contested ideas put forward by John 
Stuart Mill by analyzing the reasons and arguments Mill used to sup-
port them and demonstrating how these ideas and arguments support-
ing them are connected into a coherent system. Mill’s theory is placed 
in wider explanatory framework of democratic legitimacy developed by 
Thomas Christiano, and is portrayed as a typical example of democrat-
ic instrumentalism—a monistic position that focuses on the outcomes 
and results of a decision-making process. Following this move, the focus 
is shifted on the understanding of political equality in Mill’s political 
thought. I claim that, contrary to some contemporary interpretations, 
Mill’s theory is based on a few fundamentally inegalitarian ideas. Fi-
nally, Mill’s view on the role of experts in democratic decision-making is 
analyzed and compared with contemporary theories advocating demo-
cratic expertism—Mill’s view is again portrayed as inegalitarian, both 
to the extent of setting political aims and creating methods for achieving 
these aims.
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1. Introduction
Many books and papers have been published criticizing Mill’s plural 
voting proposal and analyzing its strengths and weaknesses, as well as 
trying to implement it (or criticize it) from the standpoint of contem-
porary western democracies (Baccarini 1993, Baccarini & Ivanković 
2015, Brilhante & Rocha 2013, Gaus 2003, Miller 2003, Thompson 
1976, Urbinati 2002). Unfortunately, it seems that Mill’s original work 
is somehow neglected in favor of some notable interpretations, and 
the emphasis is sometimes placed on implementation of Mill’s ideas in 
contemporary society without fi rst analyzing and understanding the 
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justifi catory process Mill carefully developed to support those ideas. 
This paper aims to clarify some of the contested ideas by analyzing 
the reasons and arguments Mill used to support them, as well as to 
emphasize how these ideas and arguments are connected into a coher-
ent system. Furthermore, this paper tries to determine what is the role 
of plural voting in Mill’s argument and how exactly does the plural 
voting proposal improve the epistemic quality of a democratic decision-
making process.
First part of this paper sets Mill’s account in the wider explanatory 
framework of democratic legitimacy developed by Thomas Christiano. 
Mill’s view is portrayed as a typical example of democratic instru-
mentalism—a monistic position that focuses on the results of a deci-
sion-making process when discussing the legitimacy of the decisions 
produced by this process. Mill’s understanding of political equality is 
discussed in the second part: by introducing Berlin’s distinction be-
tween positive and negative liberties, I claim that Mill argued only for 
the equality of negative liberties. Positive liberties, those inherent to a 
participatory democratic process, are not to be equally distributed. Val-
ues of deliberative democracy and diverse perspectives are discussed in 
the third part. By building on this ideas, I point out why Mill believed 
that everyone should have a say in a decision-making process, though 
not everyone should have an equal say. Plural voting proposal satisfi es 
perfectly the requirement Mill had in mind (unequal political power 
but participation of all in decision-making process) and is discussed 
in the fourth part of the paper. There I stress again Mill’s allegiance 
to democratic instrumentalism by comparing his view on experts with 
the views of Thomas Christiano and Philip Kitcher. While Christiano 
and Kitcher advocate for equality in the process of setting up political 
aims (and give greater power to the experts only when discussing the 
implementation of the already set aims), I claim that Mill rejects the 
idea of equality both in the process of setting up aims and in the pro-
cess of their implementation (though he has a different standard for 
identifying experts in these two domains). Some concluding remarks 
are presented in the fi nal part of the paper, emphasizing the important 
role of public justifi cation for Mill’s view.
2. Background
Whenever we try to justify or argue for certain form of government, 
we start by enlisting its virtues (Swift 2006). Contemporary political 
philosophy divides these virtues depending on whether they are the 
virtues of a decision-making process or of the fi nal outcome produced 
by this process (Christiano 2004). In order to give an account of demo-
cratic legitimacy presented by John Stuart Mill, as well as to compare 
his position with those of contemporary defenders of epistemic democ-
racy, one fi rst has to clarify the criteria listed above and set Mill’s view 
according to them.
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Pure proceduralism focuses only on purely procedural qualities of 
a decision-making procedure when determining its legitimacy-gener-
ating potential. These purely procedural (sometimes called intrinsic) 
qualities are defi ned regardless of procedure’s ability to produce cer-
tain goal or outcome—a decision-making procedure has legitimacy-
generating potential because it embodies some important moral (or 
epistemic) qualities. Procedural fairness (i.e. giving every citizen an 
equal chance to participate in the decision-making process) can be one 
such purely procedural quality. A collective decision is thus legitimate 
if (and only if) it was produced by a fair decision-making procedure. Po-
sitions developed by Hannah Arendt (1967), Thomas Christiano (2008), 
Gerald Gaus (1996), Fabienne Peter (2011), Iris Marion Young (2000) 
and Robert Dahl (1989) are some examples of pure proceduralism.
Instrumentalism, on the other hand, focuses only on the instru-
mental qualities of a decision-making procedure when determining 
its legitimacy-generating potential. These instrumental qualities are 
defi ned by procedure’s ability to reach a desired aim or outcome—a de-
cision-making procedure has legitimacy-generating potential because 
of its ability to generate decisions with some substantial, procedure-
independent quality. The ability to produce correct, true or just deci-
sions can be one such instrumental quality. A collective decision is thus 
legitimate if (and only if) it was produced by a decision-making proce-
dure that has tendency to produce correct or true decisions. Positions 
developed by Steven Wall (2007) and Richard Arneson (2003b), but also 
by Robert Talisse (2009) and Cheryl Misak (2000) are some examples of 
political instrumentalism.
We can try to justify democratic legitimacy by referring to one of 
these virtues, in which case we will be endorsing some monistic posi-
tion, or we can try to justify democratic legitimacy by referring to both 
virtues, in which case we will be endorsing some non-monistic posi-
tion.1 The standard account of epistemic democracy put forward by Da-
vid Estlund (2008) represents one such non-monistic position, focusing 
on both the fairness of the procedure and the qualities of the outcome.
1 The distinction between monistic and non-monistic positions was fi rst 
introduced by Christiano (2004).
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3. Mill’s criteria for legitimacy
Mill asserts that the best form of government is the one that best 
achieves the following two goals: (i) improving the virtue and intelli-
gence of the people under its jurisdiction, and (ii) organizing the exist-
ing virtues and good qualities of the people in a way that promotes the 
long-run common good.
One criterion of the goodness of a government [is] the degree in 
which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, 
collectively and individually; since, besides that their well-being is the 
sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force 
which works the machinery. The other constituent element of the merit 
of a government [is] the quality of machinery itself; that is, the degree 
in which it is adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities 
which may at any time exist, and make them instrumental to the right 
purposes. (Mill 1977a: 390–391)
The same two criteria reappear, more or less reformulated, through-
out his entire work.
[Merit which any set of political institutions can possess] consists partly 
of a degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the 
community, including [...] advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practi-
cal activity and effi ciency; and partly of the degree of perfection with which 
they organize the moral, intellectual and active worth already existing, so 
as to operate with the greatest effect of public affairs. (Mill 1977a: 392)
However, it seems that the basic and unifying criterion behind these 
two are benefi cial consequences (Sandel 2009, Peter 2014). There-
fore, though Mill enlists two criteria of good governance, his position 
remains monistic since both criteria regard only the consequences of 
a procedure (i.e. whether the procedure produces good decisions and 
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whether the procedure improves the qualities of citizens). Following 
Mill’s utilitarian account characterized by the differentiation between 
higher-quality and lower-quality pleasures, the best form of govern-
ment is to be understood as the one that produces maximal aggregate 
long-run utility (excellence-weighted pleasure).
The ideally best form of government is [...] the one which [...] is attended 
with the greatest amount of benefi cial consequences, immediate and pro-
spective (Mill 1977a: 404)
It is rather clear that Mill uses a procedure-independent criterion for 
evaluating the quality of the outcomes. A political decision can be good 
or bad regardless of the procedure that has produced it. This is par-
ticularly clear when Mill uses an epistemic argument to argue against 
despotic monarchy; even if there would be a wise benevolent despot, 
he would be unable to detect and promote the common good, as well as 
particular interests of different individuals, as effi ciently as represen-
tative (democratic) government. A political decision is good or bad re-
gardless of the procedure that has produced it; its quality is evaluated 
in the light of its consequences.
Mill adopts the instrumentalist position: a form of government is 
only legitimate if it produces the greatest possible amount of benefi cial 
consequences. He avoids the common objections against utilitarianism 
by introducing the differentiation between higher-quality and lower-
quality pleasures, as well as by strongly arguing that only by preser-
vation of individual liberties we can maximize utility in a long-run.2 
However, his argumentation has an instrumental form; in order to be 
legitimate, a form of government has to improve intellectual and moral 
qualities of its citizens, as well as to organize them in such a way as to 
produce the best possible outcomes (Peter 2014).
What form of government will prove itself as the best depends on 
the people it is exercised upon. Tyranny will be the best form of govern-
ment for barbarian tribes, since it will best improve their intellectual 
and moral qualities (e.g. teach them to obey the laws), as well as or-
ganize them in a manner they, because of the lack of discipline, would 
otherwise be unable to do themselves. Democracy is preferred to tyr-
anny, but only when discussing developed societies where certain pre-
conditions have already been met. This emphasizes the instrumental 
approach used by Mill: what form of government is legitimate depends 
on the type of society we want to apply it upon. Different forms of gov-
2 Mill’s famous essay ‘On Liberty’ can be viewed as a unifi ed attempt to argue in 
favor of individual liberty from the consequentialist (utilitarian) standpoint. All four 
reasons that explain why we should uphold individual liberty have an instrumental 
form—we should not silent the dissents because such an action would produce ill 
consequences for our society: we might be deprived of true or partially true belief, 
our own belief might harden into dogma and prejudice, and forcing the members of 
a society to embrace custom and convention is likely to deprive them of the energy 
and vitality for social improvement. For detailed argumentation see Mill 1879 and 
Sandel 2009.
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ernment will yield different results when applied to different societ-
ies. Democracy is thus instrumentally justifi ed: if we want to promote 
intellectual and moral qualities of individuals in our society, and if we 
want to organize them to produce the best possible outcomes, we should 
embrace democracy as a proper form of collective decision-making.
4. Expertism and equality
Mill’s democratic instrumentalism can sometimes be mistaken for a 
weak kind of (epistemic) proceduralism: after all, Mill does not think 
that political decision is legitimate if and only if it has benefi cial conse-
quences. According to such view, whenever one has a reason to doubt 
the quality of consequences of a political decision, one could say that he 
does not recognize that particular decision as legitimate. This surely 
is not the result Mill had in mind. Furthermore, we could question the 
extent to which such view improves intellectual and moral qualities of 
the people involved. The decision-making procedure is very important 
for Mill—it has to be organized in such a way as to satisfy two criteria 
of good government, i.e. to improve the intellectual and moral qualities 
of people and to organize their potentials to maximize the quality of 
results. A decision is thus legitimate if it is a product of a good decision-
making procedure. Though this might seem as a form of democratic 
proceduralism, we must note that the justifi cation of the procedure is 
purely instrumental (Peter 2014). Mill does not fi nd democracy superior 
to despotic monarchy because the former respects the equality of all the 
people involved, and the latter does not. His arguments for democracy 
have instrumental form; we should prefer democracy because it pro-
duces better outcomes, i.e. it is better in improving our moral and intel-
lectual qualities, as well as in producing better decisions. Unlike Est-
lund and other philosophers who adopt non-monistic positions, putting 
emphasis on both the fairness of a procedure and the quality of results it 
produces, Mill’s view is monistic—only the results are important.
Some might argue otherwise by stressing the importance of equal-
ity in Mill’s political thought, especially in his famous essay On Liberty 
(Justman 1990). Though equality is indeed a very important idea for 
Mill, we must notice that in On Liberty Mill refers primarily on the idea 
of negative liberty, i.e. the area within which the subject—a person or 
group of persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or 
be, without interference by other persons (Berlin 1969). Mill’s thoughts 
on positive liberty, i.e. his answer to the question what, or who, is the 
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or 
be, this rather than that (Berlin 1969), are quite different. Mill explic-
itly distinguishes the power that one has over oneself alone and the 
power one has over others:3
3 I thank David Miller for pointing this idea and encouraging me to analyse Mill’s 
Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform in detail.
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They say that everyone has an equal interest in being well governed, and 
that every one, therefore, has an equal claim to control over his own govern-
ment. I might agree to this, if control over his own government were really 
a thing in question; but what I am asked to assent is, that every individual 
has an equal claim to control over the government of the other people. The 
power that suffrage gives is not over himself alone (i.e. negative liberty) it 
is power over others also (i.e. positive liberty): whatever control the voter 
is able to exercise over his own concerns, he exercises the same degree of 
it over those of every one else. Now, it can in no sort be admitted that all 
persons have an equal claim to power over others (Mill 1977b: 323)
It seems that equality does not play an important role in Mill’s thoughts 
on collective decision-making procedures, though it still plays an im-
portant role with regard to the development of individual capacities 
(Baccarini 2013, Macpherson 2012); it is very important to ensure the 
equal protection of everyone’s basic negative liberties (e.g. freedom of 
thought, speech, press and assembly), but equality should be rejected 
and opposed when discussing positive liberties. It should instead be 
replaced with competence and (non-equal) participation, because these 
are the key virtues needed to achieve better quality of political deci-
sions.4
This particular idea is nicely implemented in the plural voting prac-
tice suggested by Mill. He indicates two motives for this proposal: (i) 
to prevent one group of people from being able to control the political 
process without having to give reasons in order to have suffi cient sup-
port, and (ii) to avoid giving each person an equal chance to infl uence 
political decisions without regard to their merit, intelligence etc.
Yet in this stage of things, the great majority of voters [...] are manual labor-
ers; and a twofold danger, that of too low a standard of political intelligence, 
and that of class legislation, would still exist in a very perilous degree. (Mill 
1977a: 473)
4 To additionally stress this point, it might be useful to point out important 
differences between Mill’s approach and the approach of those who base democratic 
legitimacy on the idea of equality (e.g. Thomas Christiano). Christiano builds his 
theory on a basic claim that human beings are authorities in the realm of value 
because (i) they are capable of recognizing, appreciating and producing value, and 
because (ii) their exercise of this authority is itself intrinsically valuable. Christiano 
further claims that equal status of persons is based on the fact that human beings 
all have essential the same basic capacities to be authorities in the realm of value 
(Christiano 2008). Mill, on the other hand, believes that people are obviously 
differently capable of appreciating intrinsic values (his version of ‘higher pleasures’ 
utilitarianism), and that differences in capacity should produce differences in status. 
This does not imply that those who are better educated should direct the private 
lives of those who are not (Mill clearly stresses this point in ‘On Liberty’), nor should 
they have absolute power in political arena (this is pointed out in ‘Considerations 
on Representative Government’). The underlying reason for this is not equality, 
however, but the idea that intellectual and moral qualities of all human beings 
should be cherished and improved, and that would be impossible if other people 
would direct our every action. This does not imply, however, the idea that everyone 
should have an equal say in a collective decision-making process.
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Some scholars (often following the republican tradition) seem to be-
lieve that the main motive Mill had to suggest plural voting was to 
stop the tyranny of majority in a form of class legislation (Brilhante 
& Rocha 2013, Honohan 2002, Justman 1990, Miller 2000). After all, 
introducing plural voting and giving the educated (i.e. the minority of 
voters) more than one vote might look like an attempt to defend the re-
publican value of non-domination (Pettit 1999). For example, Brilhante 
and Rocha claim “Mill would not have favored inequalities that implied 
undue power over others because this would undermine the autonomy 
that was a central value in his political philosophy. He advocated the 
plural voting system on the assumption that it would increase general 
happiness by preventing the tyranny of the majority” (2013: 62). The 
danger of too low standard of political intelligence is often neglected, 
and the entire plural voting proposal is regarded as a temporary solu-
tion Mill used ‘ in [his] stage of things’, i.e. to answer the problem of 
British electorate in 19th century. However, there are good reasons to 
consider Mill’s plural voting account as a permanent solution. In fact, 
Mill’s own words oppose those who think that plural voting is only a 
temporary solution that should not be considered as an important part 
of his political thought.
I do not propose the plurality as a thing in itself undesirable, which, like the 
exclusion of a part of the community from the suffrage, may be temporarily 
tolerated while necessary to prevent greater evils. (Mill 1977a: 478)
It is clear, in fact, that Mill’s main reason for plural voting is not class 
legislation, the ‘greater evil’ from the previous quote. Even in a society 
where there is no fear of one class or group of people being able to con-
trol the political process without having to give reasons in order to have 
suffi cient support, Mill would still opt for plural voting and against the 
equality of votes.
I do not look upon equal voting as among the things which are good in them-
selves, provided they can be guarded against inconveniences. I look upon it 
as only relatively good [...], but in principle wrong, because of recognizing 
a wrong standard, and exercising a bad infl uence on the voter’s mind. It is 
not useful, but hurtful, that the constitution of a country should declare ig-
norance to be entitled to as much political power as knowledge. (Mill 1977a: 
478)
Mill was strongly infl uenced by the classical political philosophy, and 
his plural voting proposal can be seen as a combination of Plato’s epis-
tocracy and Aristotle’s democracy. Following Plato, Mill emphasized 
the value of greater wisdom of the few, while following Aristotle he em-
braced the value of diverse perspectives for political decision-making. 
(Estlund 2003: 57) Though Mill never embraced Plato’s epistocracy (be-
cause it denied the value of diverse perspectives for decision-making, 
as well as because it was not compatible with the account of moral and 
intellectual improvement of the people), he considered the idea that 
competence should have greater weight than incompetence very ap-
pealing.
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[... ] that governing is not a thing which can be done at odd times, or by the 
way, in conjunction with a hundred other pursuits, nor to which a person 
can be competent without a large and liberal general education, followed by 
special and professional study, laborious and of long duration, directed to 
acquiring, not mere practical dexterity, but a scientifi c mastery of the sub-
ject. This is the strong side of the Platonic theory. (Mill 1978: 436)
When two persons who have a joint interest in any business, differ in opin-
ion, does justice require that both opinions should be held of exactly equal 
value? If [...] one is superior to other in knowledge and intelligence, the 
judgment of a higher moral or intellectual being is worth more than that of 
an inferior: and if the institutions of the country virtually assert that they 
are of the same value, they assert a thing which is not. One of the two, as a 
wiser or better man, has a claim to a superior weight [...] (Mill 1977a: 473)
It seems clear that Mill argued for deliberative democracy on instru-
mental grounds; his plural voting proposal is an example of such argu-
mentative strategy.
5. Deliberative democracy
One has to notice, however, that the reason why plural voting is intro-
duced is not only to improve the quality of decisions produced by collec-
tive decision-making process. Mill emphasizes the educational role of 
democracy, and of the experts as well. Their infl uence will improve the 
quality of decisions, but it will also help common people further develop 
their intellectual and moral skills.
There are very good reasons not to believe that Mill adopted a form 
of elitism that could lead to epistocracy. We have indicated earlier that 
Mill recognizes the value of diverse perspectives, as well as the dan-
ger of class legislation. If we give overly exaggerated political power to 
certain group of people (even if they are experts), the danger of class 
legislation is reintroduced, and the value of diverse perspectives is lost. 
This value of diverse perspectives is best introduced through delibera-
tion; though one can argue that even a form of aggregative democracy 
could take advantage of diverse perspectives and produce high-quality 
outcomes (e.g. Marquis de Condorcet, Kenneth Arrow), this is only one 
of the two goals of the good government. The other one, development 
of our intellectual and moral qualities, can only be achieved through 
deliberation.
Those who are supreme over everything, whether they be One, Few or 
Many, have no longer need of the arms of reason; they can make their mere 
will prevail; and those who cannot be resisted are usually to well satisfi ed 
with their own opinions to be willing to change them, or listen without im-
patience to anyone who tells them that they are in the wrong. [...] the one 
which develops the best and highest qualities is the position of those who 
are strong enough to make reason prevail, but not strong enough to prevail 
against reason. (Mill 1977a: 478–479)
Following this argumentation, one could be led to believe that the only 
reason for plural voting is to attain the balance between groups or 
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classes that would force them to deliberate instead of simply asserting 
their will, and the only reason for adopting deliberative procedures is 
to improve the moral and intellectual qualities of people engaged in de-
liberation. There are good reasons not to embrace this interpretation: 
though Mill’s argumentation was aimed to maximize the individual 
liberty, this liberty can be limited when our actions have impact on 
lives of other individuals. As long as we make decisions that are within 
our private sphere, neither majority of the people nor (moral) experts 
should have an authority to limit our liberty. Things change, however, 
when our decisions infl uence other people beside us, just like all politi-
cal decisions do. Giving greater power to the voice of an expert in such 
situation can be legitimate.
There would be no pretence for applying this doctrine to any case which 
could with reason be considered as one of individual and private right. In an 
affair that concerns only one of two persons, that one is entitled to follow his 
own opinion, however much wiser the other might be than himself. But we 
are speaking of things that equally concern them both; where, if the more 
ignorant does not yield to the guidance of the wiser man, the wiser man 
must resign to more ignorant. [...] No one but a fool, and a fool of peculiar 
description, feels offended by the acknowledgement that there are others 
whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to a greater amount of con-
sideration than his. (Mill 1977a: 473–474)
6. The role of plural voting
Mill is well aware of the defects any form of government might have. 
He points out that the worst defects a democratic government might 
face are its inability to produce good decisions and its tendency to be 
infl uenced by particular interests of dominant groups (Mill 1977: 436). 
Plural voting was introduced as a means to counter these defects: its 
main purpose was to ensure that the representative government pro-
duces high quality outcomes, and that no group has exclusive right to 
the benefi ts of social cooperation by the power of votes alone (and with-
out having to deliberate and convince others to support the decision in 
question).
It is unclear, however, how exactly was plural voting proposal 
supposed to counter the fi rst defect of democratic government, i.e. to 
ensure that the procedure produces good decisions. How was plural 
voting supposed to achieve its purpose? In their recent paper, Bacca-
rini and Ivanković (2015) claim that plural voting proposal seriously 
threatens the quality of outcomes. It is unclear at which stage of the 
decision-making process does the epistemic value of plural voting help 
us create better policies and decisions. They analyze the problem stage 
(where political values are expressed and some problems are detect-
ed), the proposal stage (where the educated commission drafts laws 
and policies), and the approval stage (where the Parliament chooses 
to pass or reject a certain law proposed by the commission), and claim 
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that plural voting proposal does not bring epistemic value in any of the 
stages mentioned above. Similar objections are raised by Gaus (2008) 
and Peter (2012), who claim that it is very diffi cult to determine who 
the experts regarding some political issue are, and add that the rel-
evant competences for making political decisions are often so widely 
dispersed that the (epistemic) distinction between citizens and experts 
is small and irrelevant, just like the (epistemic) distinction between 
procedures characterized by equal suffrage and those characterized by 
plural voting.
I do not want to argue that Mill’s plural voting proposal has an 
epistemic value—all I want is to show why did Mill think it had epis-
temic value, and in which stage of the decision-making process did this 
epistemic value manifest itself. In order to answer these questions, we 
must fi rst analyze the sophisticated structure of democratic govern-
ment and the key stages of democratic decision-making process, as well 
as different concepts of expertise.
Thomas Christiano (2008) introduces a useful differentiation be-
tween technical and moral knowledge. Technical knowledge regards 
crafts, skills and disciplines like engineering, medicine, carpentry, 
physics, law or computer sciences. Most people can see this knowledge 
as useful and some educational institutions can be publicly seen as 
reliable sources of this knowledge. However, there is another kind of 
knowledge, one that regards what is right and what is wrong. This 
moral knowledge is about values and it is not as public as technical 
knowledge is, since we have a widespread disagreement on both the 
moral issues and the experts in morality (Christiano 2008). Mill agrees 
that the technical knowledge is probably more public that the moral 
knowledge, but unlike Christiano he thinks that we can still deter-
mine those whose ‘opinions and even wishes’ should be given greater 
consideration. Mill does not set strict constrains on education (he does 
not insist that only philosophers, or only experts in political science or 
economics, have greater political power), nor does he name the exact 
profession one has to have in order to have a plural vote. His main idea 
is that people who have dedicated some time and effort to improving 
their intellectual and moral capacities are generally more capable of 
knowing what is more valuable in life (they are better acquainted with 
higher pleasures), and therefore are more capable of setting valuable 
aims for the society in general.
Mill fi rmly believed in the idea of epistemic division of labor and 
consequently, that laws and political decisions should be made by the 
most competent members of a society (i.e. experts). He saw division of 
labor as one of the central reasons for rejecting direct democracy, but 
nonetheless did not believe that parliament should make laws, public 
policies and political decisions. This task was appointed to small expert 
bodies (commissions), while it was the task of the Parliament to discuss 
and deliberate on proposed laws and decisions, as well as to accept or 
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refuse proposals made by such commissions (Mill 1977: 424). Unlike 
expert bodies, Mill did not think that the Parliament should be com-
posed primarily of experts:
[Members of parliament] are not a selection of the greatest political minds 
in the country, from whose opinions little could with certainty be inferred 
concerning those of the nation, but are, when properly constituted, a fair 
sample of every grade of intellect among the people which is at all entitled 
to a voice in public affairs. Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for 
popular demands, a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to 
public matters, both great and small [...] (Mill 1977a: 433)
Therefore, considering the division of labor and a purely deliberative 
function of the parliament, Mill did not have in mind that plural voting 
will directly ensure more competent law-makers and policy-makers. 
The competences of law-makers and policy-makers can be similar both 
under monarchical and democratic rule (Mill 1977a: 438–439). Plural 
voting is introduced to give additional strength to opinions and even 
wishes of those better educated, and to increase the number of people 
representing these opinions and wishes in the parliament. If small ex-
pert bodies (commissions) are those who devise practical means (laws, 
policies, decisions) to achieve a desired political end, it is parliament 
who sets these political ends, and in setting them, the parliament rep-
resents the general public, but plural voting enables it to put a greater 
emphasis on those ends that well-educated people consider valuable 
(because their opinions are better represented in the parliament). 
Plural voting thus improves the quality of political decisions not by 
improving the technical process of fi nding best practical solutions to 
designated problems, but by improving the quality of political aims we 
as a society want to achieve. In other words, the epistemic value of plu-
ral voting is introduced primarily in the problem stage of democratic 
decision-making process. What shall we defi ne as a problem in a society 
depends on the values and aims we want to pursue. For example, if we 
want to protect the traditional family with father as breadwinner and 
mother as caretaker (Kristol 1995), having a 40% unemployment rate 
will not be a serious political problem, as long as those unemployed 
are women. Similarly, if our political aim is full employment, even a 
5% unemployment rate can be considered a serious political problem. 
Mill believes that the plural voting proposal will affect the quality of 
aims and values set by the citizens and the Parliament, and this will 
improve the quality of laws and policies since they will now be designed 
to achieve more valuable aims.
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Mill’s view is radically different from the thoughts of many contempo-
rary political philosophers and epistemologists who discuss the role of 
experts in a democratic society. Philip Kitcher and Thomas Christiano, 
for example, agree that it is the role of a democratic process to set up 
important aims, and the role of experts to devise means for achieving 
these aims (Kitcher 2011, Christiano 2012). We should be democratic 
egalitarians when discussing political aims, and advocate expertism 
only when discussing practical means for achieving those aims. Mill 
disagrees and rejects democratic egalitarianism: there are those who 
are more competent in setting valuable aims and they should have 
greater political power in a democratic decision-making process. Of 
course, this does not imply that only those more competent should par-
ticipate in the process of defi ning valuable aims, since that would rein-
troduce the danger of class legislation, but also damage the epistemic 
value of diverse perspective.
7. Mill and public justifi cation
What makes plural voting procedure legitimate? As Estlund points out 
(Estlund 2003), Mill acknowledges the need for plural voting to be gen-
erally acceptable rather than simply correct. Authority does not follow 
from expertise, but from our acceptance that those wiser than us should 
have greater political power than us. This takes a form of hypothetical 
(or maybe normative) consent, and not a form of the actual consent.
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It is only necessary that this superior infl uence should be assigned on 
grounds which [all] can comprehend, and of which [all] are able to perceive 
justice. (Mill 1977a: 474)
This is why Mill has to fi nd a criterion for expertise that can be reason-
ably accepted by everyone. The problem is the fact that there is reason-
able disagreement on who counts as wise. However, the idea that good 
education imporves the ability to rule more wisely is uncontested.
[The distinctions in voting power] are not made arbitrary, but are such as 
can be understood and accepted by the general conscience and understand-
ing. [They are based on something that] would not necessarily be repugnant 
to any one’s sentiment of justice. (Mill 1977a: 476)
Finally, the reason why everyone should accept plural voting procedure 
is the quality of outcomes.
Which of these modes of getting over a diffi culty is most for the interest of 
both, and most conformable to the general fi tness of things? [...] that the 
better judgment should give way to the worse, or the worse to the better? 
(Mill 1977a: 473–474)
Since Mill believes that good education improves our ability to rule 
more wisely (i.e. to make better decisions), and since he believes that 
everyone shares (or should share) this belief, he emphasizes plural vot-
ing as a procedure that gives greater political power to those who can 
rule more wisely, and consequently favors it as a procedure that tends 
to create better outcomes.5
As we have seen, plural voting proposal has two goals: (i) to im-
prove the quality of the outcomes by giving the educated additional 
political power, and (ii) to improve the intellectual and moral qualities 
in individuals by making them deliberate and exchange reasons and 
arguments.
8. Conclusion
Mill was undoubtedly one of the greatest liberal philosophers and an in-
spiring source of ideas for many liberal thinkers and scholars. We must, 
however, resist an increasingly common trend of interpreting Mill’s ideas 
from the standpoint of contemporary liberal thought, especially when 
such interpretations contradict with the very statements Mill made him-
self. Plural voting proposal plays an important role in Mill’s philosophi-
cal thought—it puts together and connects various requirements and 
values Mill held as important into a coherent collective decision-making 
model. This model does not rest on the idea of political equality, but on 
the complex structure that incorporates both the epistemic value of di-
verse perspectives and the epistemic value of experts. Consequently, it 
stresses both the importance of political participation and the impor-
5 One can consistently argue against this idea and rise against it not only 
argument based on procedural fairness, but an epistemic argument as well (see 
Estlund 2003).
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tance of unequal political power citizens should have. We can discuss 
how Mill’s ideas could be implemented in a contemporary liberal phi-
losophy (e.g. is class legislation still an important issue, should everyone 
receive an equal chance of acquiring good education and thus greater 
political power, etc.), but we must not forget or misinterpret Mill’s basic 
ideas and the justifi catory process he made from them.
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